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Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O'Shea Sullivan*
Ashby'Kent Fox**
and Amanda E. Wilson***
The 2012 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions relating
to federal trial practice and procedure in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, several of which involved issues of first
impression. This Article analyzes recent developments in the Eleventh
Circuit, including significant rulings in the areas of arbitration,
statutory interpretation, subject matter jurisdiction, and civil procedure.1
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION-WHETHER A DISSOLVED
CORPORATION HAS A PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS FOR PURPOSES OF
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
In Holston Investments, Inc. B.VI. v. LanLogistics Corp.,2 the
Eleventh Circuit addressed, as a matter of first impression, whether a
dissolved or inactive corporation has a principal place of business for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.3 Holston Investments (Holston) sued
LanLogistics Corporation (LanLogistics) for breach of contract in the
* Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B.J., 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1995).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1993-1994); Managing Editor (1994-1995). Member, State
Bars of Georgia and North Carolina.
** Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2000) (Phi Beta Kappa); Emory University School of
Law (J.D., with honors, 2003). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Burr & Forman, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Florida State
University (B.S., magna cure laude, 2007); Emory University School of Law (J.D., with
honors, 2010). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of trial practice and procedure during the prior survey period, see
John O'Shea Sullivan, Ashby L. Kent & Amanda E. Wilson, Trial Practiceand Procedure,
Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 63 MERCER L. REV. 1331 (2012).

2. 677 F.3d 1068 (l1th Cir. 2012).
3.

Id. at 1070.
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United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
alleging diversity jurisdiction. Holston was a citizen of Florida.
LanLogistics was a Delaware corporation headquartered in Florida.
When Holston filed suit, LanLogistics had dissolved and forfeited its
authority to conduct business in Florida.4
LanLogistics challenged the district court's subject matter jurisdiction
and moved to vacate the final judgment.5 LanLogistics argued that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the corporation was a
citizen of Florida, like Holston, and thus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332,6
the parties were not diverse.7 The district court found that diversity
jurisdiction existed, and LanLogistics appealed.8
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[d]iversity jurisdiction is
determined at the time the complaint was filed,"9 and a corporation
shall be deemed to be a citizen of both the state in which it was
incorporated and the state where it has its principal place of business."
The court acknowledged that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to
"'provide a separate forum for out-of-state citizens against the prejudices
of local courts and local juries. '""' Discussing whether complete
diversity existed between Holston and LanLogistics, the court stated
that "[t]he issue here is whether a dissolved or inactive corporation has
a principal place of business."" The court noted that it was a case of
first impression for the Eleventh Circuit, and the others circuits are not
in agreement. 3
The court first cited the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit's finding that "a corporation's principal place of business must be
identified regardless of whether the corporation is defunct."' 4 This
approach recognized that a dissolved corporation may "still have a local

4. Id. at 1069-70.
5. Id. at 1070.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
7. Holston, 677 F.3d at 1070. This statute provides that"[flederal courts have subjectmatter jurisdiction over civil actions in which: (1) 'the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs'; and (2) the action is between
'citizens of different States.'" Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2006).
8. Holston, 677 F.3d at 1069.
9. Id. at 1070 (citing Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957) for the proposition
that "[J]urisdiction, once attached, is not impaired by a party's later change of domicile.").
10. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).
11. Holston, 677 F.3d at 1070 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1830, at 3 (1958), reprintedin 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3102).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing W.M. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d
131, 141 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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presence that would alleviate concerns about local bias."' 5 The Second
Circuit found that if a dissolved corporation is deemed to be a citizen of
the state where it last conducted business, that "ensures federal
jurisdiction will not be extended to corporations to which Congress had
no intention of providing the benefit." 6 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected finding a principal place if one
does not exist.'7 Thus, the court held that a "dissolved ...corporation
is a citizen only of the state in which it was incorporated." 8
By contrast, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits utilize the "facts and circumstances test," 9 and held that
"the extent of a corporation's local character drives the determination as
to whether a principal place of business exists for purposes of federal
jurisdiction."2 These circuits found that a state where a corporation
had been inactive for a substantial period of time should not be deemed
the corporation's principal place of business.2 '
The Eleventh Circuit also looked to the United States Supreme Court's
22 which held that "simple jurisdictiondecision in Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
al tests are preferable even if application of the rule occasionally cuts
against the basic rationale of [28 U.S.C.] § 1332.23 In Hertz, the
Supreme Court reasoned that courts should require "'straightforward
rules under which they can readily assure themselves of their power to
hear a case.' 24 Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Hertz held that a
"corporation's principal place of business is determined [by] where the
25
corporation's 'nerve center' is located."

15.

Id.

16. Id. at 1070-71 (citing PassalacquaBuilders, 933 F.2d at 141).
17. Id. at 1071 (citing Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 698 (3d Cir. 1995)).
18. Id. (citing Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 48 F.3d at 696).
19. Id. (citing Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also
Athena Auto, Inc. v. DiGregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 291 (4th Cir. 1999).
20. Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (citing Harris, 961 F.2d at 551).
21. Id.
22. 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).
23. Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (citing Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1193-94).
24. Id. (quoting Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1193). In Hertz, the Supreme Court held that
[c]
omplex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time and money as the
parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which court is the right court
to decide those claims. Complex tests produce appeals and reversals, encourage
gamesmanship, and, again, diminish the likelihood that results and settlements
will reflect a claim's legal and factual merits.
Id. (quoting Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1193 (internal citations omitted)).
25. Id.

994

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Third Circuit's rule that a dissolved
corporation lacks a principal place of business.26 The court held that
this rule aligned closely with the Supreme Court's analysis in Hertz,
whereas the Second Circuit's rule focused not on a corporation's nerve
center approach, but rather on where its business was last conducted."
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's approach because,
a citizen of a state in
"under that rule a corporation could be considered
28
which it was not a citizen before dissolution."
Applying this analysis to the instant case, the Eleventh Circuit held
that because LanLogistics had dissolved and lost its ability to conduct
business in Florida at the time Holston filed suit, LanLogistics was not
a citizen of Florida, but rather was only a citizen of Delaware, the state
where it was incorporated.2 9 Thus, complete diversity of citizenship
existed, and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. °
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-WHETHER THE HOME AFFORDABLE
MODIFICATION PROGRAM PROVIDES AN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION TO BORROWERS

In Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC,3 1 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed, for the first time in a published opinion, whether the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) provides an implied private
right of action to borrowers against loan servicers" In Miller, borrower Jason Miller (Miller) sued his mortgage lender, Chase Home Finance,
LLC (Chase), alleging that Chase violated HAMP by declining to modify
Miller's loan. 3 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia dismissed Miller's complaint, finding in pertinent
part that HAMP did not provide a private right of action. Miller
appealed and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that HAMP did not

26. Id. The court noted that "[tihis bright-line rule may open federal courts to an
occasional corporation with a lingering local presence, but undeserved access to a fair
forum is a small price to pay for the clarity and predictability that a bright-line rule
provides." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
677 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1116.

Id. at 1115. The plaintiff alleged that Chase's failure to give him a permanent loan
modification gave "rise to claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) promissory estoppel." Id.
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provide borrowers with an express or implied private right of action to
sue their loan servicers. 34
The court noted that HAMP was promulgated by the Department of
the Treasury, as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 (EESA).35 HAMP was designed to "prevent avoidable home
foreclosures by incentivizing loan servicers to reduce the required
monthly mortgage payments for certain struggling homeowners."36
Although loan servicers must abide by HAMP's guidelines when
determining whether a borrower is eligibile for a loan modification, the
Treasury Secretary designated Freddie Mac to conduct compliance
assessments of HAMP participants. 37 Because "[n]either HAMP nor
EESA expressly creates a private right of action for borrowers against
loan servicers," the issue before the court was whether an implied
private right of action exists under HAMP. 8
The court looked to the following factors in its analysis:
(1) is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted; (2) is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one; (3) is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply a
remedy for the plaintiff; and (4) is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States,
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
on federal law.39
Applying these factors to HAMP and EESA, the court held that it is
"clear that no implied right of action exists."4 °
First, the court noted that EESA and HAMP were designed to help
restore stability to the nation's economy and were not passed for the
"especial benefit" of homeowners, even though the homeowners may
benefit from HAMP's incentives to loan servicers.4' Second, the court
discerned no "legislative intent to create a private right of action" for
borrowers under HAMP; rather, Congress gave the Treasury Secretary
the right to bring a cause of action under the Administrative Procedure

34. Id. at 1115-17.
35. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5261 (Supp. III 2009); Miller, 677 F.3d at 1115-16.
36. Miller, 677 F.3d at 1116.
37. Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program Handbook for
Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages 27 (2011)).
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. (quoting Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d
1351, 1362 n.14 (11th Cir. 2008)).

40. Id.
41. Id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5201(1).
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Act.42 Third, the court held that a private right of action against
mortgage servicers would contravene HAMP's purpose of encouraging
servicers to modify loans, because a private right of action would likely
discourage servicer participation based on fear of exposure to litigaFinally, the court found that it should not infer a cause of
tion.'
state law generally governs the law of
action under HAMP because
44
contracts and real property.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that because none of the relevant
factors favored finding an implied private right of action under HAMP,
the right does not exist.4 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
District Court's finding that Miller lacked standing to pursue his claims
against Chase insofar as they were premised on an alleged breach of
HAMP obligations.46
III.

FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

A. Whether a Defendant's Settlement Proposal Which Offers To Pay
the Full Amount of Statutory Damages Requested, But Does Not
Contain an Offer of Judgment Against Defendant, Moots a Plaintiffs
Claims Under the FairDebt Collection PracticesAct
In Zinni v. ER Solutions, Inc.,47 the Eleventh Circuit addressed
whether a defendant's settlement proposal, which offered to pay the full
amount of statutory damages requested under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA)4 s but did not contain an offer of judgment
against the defendant, moots a plaintiff's claims under the FDCPA.49
In Zinni, the plaintiffs appealed the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida's dismissal of their complaints against
various debt-collector defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In each case, the plaintiffs sought to recover statutory damages and
attorney fees and costs under the FDCPA, plus a judgment in their favor
against the defendants. The defendants offered to settle the plaintiffs'
42. Miller, 677 F.3d at 1116; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5229(a)(1).
43. Miller, 677 F.3d at 1116.
44. Id. (quoting Fidelity Fed. S & L Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 174 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
45. Id. (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988) ("The intent of
Congress remains the ultimate issue, however, and unless this congressional intent can be
inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the
essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.'")).
46. Id. at 1117.
47. 692 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2012).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1692(k) (2006).
49. 692 F.3d at 1163, 1166.
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FDCPA claims for $1,001. This amount exceeded the maximum
statutory damages available for an individual plaintiff under the FDCPA
by one dollar.5 ° The defendants also offered to pay the plaintiffs'
attorney fees and costs but did not specify the amount to be paid.5 '
The defendants did not offer to have judgment entered against them as
part of the settlement."
The plaintiffs did not accept the settlement offers, and the defendants
filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 5'3 The district court granted
the motions, finding the settlement offers mooted the plaintiffs' claims
54
and left the plaintiffs with "no remaining stake" in the litigation.
The plaintiffs appealed and the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding
that the settlement offers did not render the plaintiffs' claims moot or
divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.5 In so holding,
the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the issue of "whether [defendants'] settlement offers for the full amount of statutory damages
requested under the FDCPA rendered [plaintiffs'] claims moot, requiring
their dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)" was an issue of first impression in the
Eleventh Circuit.55
Analyzing the question of mootness, the court noted that "[an issue
is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to
which the court can give meaningful relief'57 and noted that "[olffers
for the full relief requested have been found to moot a claim."" The
plaintiffs argued that the offers to settle did not equal full relief because
the defendants did not agree to an entry of judgment against them.59
Conversely, the defendants argued that
the lack of an offer of judgment
60
did not preclude a mootness finding.

50.

Id. at 1163-66. "A debt collector can be held liable for an individual plaintiffs

actual damages, statutory damages up to $1,000, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees."
Id. at 1164 n.3 (quoting Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 584 F.3d 1350, 1352
(11th Cir. 2009)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)-(3).
51. Zinni, 692 F.3d at 1164.
52. Id. at 1164-65.

53. Id. at 1164; see also FED. R.
54.
55.
56.
57.
1210,
58.
59.
60.

Civ. P. 12.

Zinni, 692 F.3d at 1164.
Id.
Id. at 1166 & n.7.
Id. at 1166 (quoting Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d
1216 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit held that the defendants' failure to offer
judgment as part of the settlement was critical to the mootness analysis
because it demonstrated that the defendants had never offered the full
relief requested by plaintiffs. 1 The court held that a judgment was
important to the plaintiffs because the district court could not enforce
the settlement otherwise." Without an offer of judgment accompanying the settlement offers, the plaintiffs were left with a promise to pay,
and if the defendants did not pay, the plaintiffs faced the prospect of
having to file a new lawsuit to compel compliance.
In support of its holding, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision in Simmons v.
United Mortgage & Loan Investment, LLC,"4 where the Fourth Circuit
held the defendants' failure to offer the full relief requested, including
an offer of judgment, "prevented the mooting" of the plaintiffs' claims
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.65 In Simmons, the court explained that a judgment:
"is far preferable to a contractual promise" to pay the same amount
"because district courts have inherent power to compel defendants to
satisfy judgments against them... but lack the power to enforce the
terms of a settlement agreement absent jurisdiction over a breach of
66
contract action for failure to comply with the settlement agreement."
Following the court's reasoning in Simmons, the Eleventh Circuit in
Zinni held that because the defendants did not offer judgment against
them as part of their settlement offers, the defendants had not offered
the full relief requested by plaintiffs; thus, the plaintiffs' claims were not

61. Id. at 1166-67 & n.8.
62. Id. at 1168.
63. Id.
64.

634 F.3d 754 (4th Cir. 2001).

65. Zinni, 692 F.3d at 1167 (citing Simmons, 634 F.3d at 766).
66. Id. (quoting Simmons, 634 F.3d at 765).
The [Fourth Circuit] cited language from Federal Trial Practiceand Procedureto
further illustrate the importance of a judgment: "Settlements often do not involve
the entry of a judgment against the defendant, as compared to a judgment of
dismissal, so that from the plaintiffs perspective the willingness of the defendant
to allow judgment to be entered has substantial importance since judgments are
enforceable under the power of the court. Indeed, should a settlement not
embodied in a judgment come unraveled, the court may be without jurisdiction to
proceed in the case, which often becomes a breach of contract action for failure to
comply with the settlement agreement. Even if the court retains jurisdiction, [the]
plaintiff is left to litigate a breach of contract action or, perhaps, to continue
litigating the claims sought to be settled."
Id. (quoting Simmons, 634 F.3d at 765).
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moot.67 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs' FDCPA claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.6"
B. Whether a Law Firm May Be Deemed a "Debt Collector"Engaging
in "Debt Collection"Activity Pursuantto the FDCPA
In Reese v. Ellis, Painter,Ratterree & Adams, LLP, s the Eleventh
Circuit examined whether a borrower could state viable claims against
a law firm for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA).7 ° The dispute in Reese arose when the plaintiffs, borrowers
Izell and Raven Reese (the Reeses), defaulted on their residential
mortgage loan. The law firm representing the Reeses' mortgage lender
sent the Reeses a letter and other documents (the Notices) demanding
payment of the underlying debt and threatening to foreclose on the
property.71 The Notices expressly referenced the Reeses' promissory
note, and advised them that "[the] Note has been and is declared to be
in default for non-payment and Lender hereby demands full and
immediate payment of all amounts due and owing thereunder."7 2
Certain Notices expressly referenced the FDCPA and stated in pertinent
part that 'THIS LAW FIRM IS ACTING
AS A DEBT COLLECTOR
73
ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT A DEBT."

The Reeses filed a putative class action lawsuit against the law firm
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
alleging that: (1) the law firm was a "debt collector," (2) it "sought to
collect debts" from the Reeses, and (3) the Notices contained "false,
deceptive or misleading representations" in violation of § 1692e of the
FDCPA. 74 The law firm moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
it was not subject to the requirements of § 1692e because: (1) it was not
a debt collector as defined by § 1692a(6) of the FDCPA, and (2) the

67. Id. at 1168.
68. Id. Because the court concluded that the defendants' settlement offers did not moot
the plaintiffs' FDCPA claims, the court "d[id] not address [plaintiffs alternate argument
that the claims were not moot because the offers did not provide for a sum certain of
attorneys' fees and costs." Id. at 1168 n.10.
69. 678 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012).
70. Id. at 1214; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
71. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1214.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1215.
74. Id. The Reeses "sought statutory damages on behalf of a proposed class consisting
of 'more than five hundred' people who received similar [notices] from the Ellis law firm."
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2) (for a violation of the FDCPA, a plaintiff may recover
statutory damages).
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Notices did not amount to debt collection activity, but instead were an
attempt to enforce a security interest in the Reeses' real property. 5
The district court granted the defendant's motion, the Reeses appealed,
and the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment.7"
The Eleventh Circuit, noting that § 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a
debt collector from using a "false, deceptive, or misleading representation
or means in connection with the collection of any debt,"" held that in
order to state a plausible FDCPA claim under § 1692e, the Reeses must
allege, among other things, that: (1) the law firm is a debt collector, and
(2) the Notices are related to debt collection.78
First, the court held that the law firm's Notices were an attempt to
"collect a 'debt"' under the FDCPA.79 According to the court, the
FDCPA's broad definition of the word debt "clearly encompass[ed] the
Reeses' payment obligations under the promissory note." 0 The Notices
expressly referenced the promissory note and demanded full and
immediate payment of all amounts owed." The court also relied on the
statements in the Notices that the law firm "IS ATTEMPTING TO
COLLECT A DEBT," and "THIS LAW FIRM IS ACTING AS A DEBT
COLLECTOR ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT A DEBT." 2 Thus, the
court held that the Reeses' complaint sufficiently alleged that the
Notices were communications relating to the collection of a debt within
the meaning of § 1692e of the FDCPA"
The court rejected the law firm's argument that the Notices were not
debt collection activity because the "purpose was simply to inform the
Reeses that [the lender] intended to enforce its security [interest]
through the process of non-judicial foreclosure." s Again, the court

75. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1215.
76. Id. at 1214, 1218-19.
77. Id. at 1216; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
78. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1216.
79. Id. at 1216-17.
80. Id. at 1216; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) ('The term 'debt' means any obligation or
alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the
money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has
been reduced to judgment"). Specifically, the court held that the Reeses's promissory note
was a "debt" within the plain language of the FDCPA because the Reeses are consumers
who must pay money to their lender, and their obligation to do so arose from a transaction
involving property that is primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Reese, 678
F.3d at 1216-17.
81. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. Id.
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noted that the Notices demanded payment of the Reeses' debt in addition
to threatening foreclosure of the property." The court held that the
law firm's argument failed to account for dual purposes of a communication, and even if the law firm intended the Notices to notify the Reeses
of foreclosure, the Notices also demanded payment of the note, even
though it is not necessary under Georgia law.86 Thus, the court held
that the Notices relating to the "enforcement of a security interest [did]
not prevent them from also relating to the collection of a debt within the
meaning of § 1692e."' T
The court further held that the law firm's argument essentially
requested an exemption from the provisions of § 1692e "any communication that attempt [ed] to enforce a security interest, regardless of whether
it also attempt[ed] to collect the underlying debt.""8 The court cautioned that this would cause a FDCPA loophole because in cases
involving a secured debt, the party demanding payment on the debt
could avoid the mandates of § 1692e by giving notice of the foreclosure
of a security interest.8 9 Declining to adopt this reasoning, the court
held that "[a] communication related to debt collection does not become
unrelated to debt collection simply because it also relates to the
enforcement of a security interest."9" Notably, because the court held
that the demand for payment of the debt in the Notices was debt
collection activity under the FDCPA, it did not address situations where
a party seeks to enforce a security interest but does not demand
payment of the underlying debt. 91
The court then analyzed whether the law firm is a debt collector
within the meaning of the FDCPA."2 The court first looked to the
statute that defines a debt collector as: "any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the
principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly

85. Id. at 1216-17. The court noted that "a promissory note is a contract evidencing a
debt and specifying terms under which one party will pay money to another," whereas "a
security interest is not a promise to pay a debt; it is an interest in collateral that a lender
can take if a debtor does not fulfill a payment obligation." Id. at 1216.
86. Id. at 1217; see also O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 (2002)) (identifying what must be
included in a notice of foreclosure).
87. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1217-18. The court held that "[tihe practical result would be that the
[FDCPA) would apply only to efforts to collect unsecured debts," and that "[as] long as a
debt was secured, a lender (or its law firm) could harass or mislead a debtor without
violating the FDCPA." Id. at 1218.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1218 n.3.
92. Id. at 1218.
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collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due
or asserted to be owed or due another." 3 In the complaint, the Reeses
alleged that the law firm was "engaged in the business of collecting
debts owed to others incurred for personal, family or household
purposes," and that the law firm had sent similar "dunning notices" to
more than 500 people.94 Thus, the court held that the Reeses' complaint alleged enough facts to show that the law firm was a debt
collector because it regularly attempts to collect debts.95 In sum,
because the Eleventh Circuit held the Reeses' allegations were sufficient
to state that the law firm was a debt collector and that the Notices were
sent "in connection with the collection of a debt" within the meaning of
§ 1692e, it reversed the district court's judgment dismissing the Reeses'
complaint for failure to state a claim under the FDCPA.9
IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE-WHETHER AND WHEN A STIPULATION OF
DISMISSAL FILED PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
41(A)(1XA)(II) IS SELF-EXECUTING

In Anago Franchising,Inc. v. Shaz, LLC,97 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed, as a matter of first impression, whether and when a
stipulation of dismissal filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is self-executing and dismisses a case upon filing, so as to
divest a district court of jurisdiction.9" The issues in Anago Franchising arose out of an alleged breach of a settlement agreement. 99 After
the parties signed the settlement agreement, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida administratively closed the
case, asked the parties to file a "Stipulation for Final Order of Dismissal," and stated that after the stipulation was filed, the court would enter
an order dismissing the case with prejudice. °° In response, the parties
filed a "Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice" which referenced rules
41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and 41(aX2), stated that all parties agreed to dismiss the
case with prejudice, and stated "that the Court shall reserve jurisdiction
to enforce the settlement between the parties pursuant to the terms
93. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) ("So a party can qualify as a 'debt collector' either
by using an 'instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails' in operating a business
that has the principal purpose of collecting debts or by 'regularly' attempting to collect
debts").
94. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1218.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1218-19.

97. 677 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2012).
98. Id. at 1277; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
99. Anago Franchising,Inc., 677 F.3d at 1273.
100. Id. at 1274.
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contained therein."10 1 The parties also filed a joint motion for entry of
final judgment. The district court signed the final judgment but never
entered an order dismissing the case. The final judgment did not
mention
the stipulation of dismissal and did not expressly dismiss the
02
case.1
After judgment was entered, the defendants filed a motion in the
district court seeking to compel the plaintiff's compliance with the
settlement agreement. °3 The assigned magistrate judge found that
the district court retained "jurisdiction to consider the motion [to compel]
because the district court had never dismissed the case-it had only
administratively closed it." 1 4 The magistrate judge's order did not
discuss the parties' stipulation of dismissal other than to note "that it
was filed and that the parties agreed that the district court would retain
jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement." 105 The magistrate
judge recommended that the defendants' motion to compel be denied,
and the district court adopted those findings and denied the motion on
the merits. The defendants appealed.'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit had to determine whether (and when)
dismissal occurred and whether the lower court "retained jurisdiction to
enforce the Settlement Agreement after that dismissal."10 7
This
required the court to clarify two legal issues: "(1) whether a stipulation
of dismissal filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) dismisses a case
automatically, and (2) whether under [the United States Supreme
Court's holdings in] Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance of America, 08 a district court may enter an order retaining jurisdiction over a
settlement agreement after a stipulation of dismissal is effectuated."0 9
Noting that "voluntary dismissal of a case strips the court of jurisdiction
and leaves it without power to make legal determinations on the merits,"
the court first analyzed the legal effect of the filing of the parties'
stipulation of dismissal. 110

101. Id.
102. Id. at 1274-75.
103. Id. at 1275.
104. Id. "The magistrate judge's jurisdictional analysis focused on the text of the final
judgment. Because the fmal judgment did not order the clerk to dismiss the case, the
magistrate judge concluded that the case had not been dismissed." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
109. Anago Franchising,Inc., 677 F.3d at 1275 (citations omitted).
110. Id.
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Looking to Rule 4 1(a), which allows plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss an
action, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the parties' stipulation of
dismissal improperly referenced both Rule 41(a)(1), which allows for
dismissal without a court order,' and Rule 41(a)(2), which requires
the court to order the case dismissed. 1 2 In determining which rule the
parties used to dismiss the case," 3 the court noted that the parties
titled the document a "stipulation," which is expressly required in Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(ii) but is not mentioned in Rule 41(a)(2).1 4 The stipulation
also states that the parties "agree to dismissal with prejudice," which is
consistent with the requirements of Rule 41(aXl) that provide "that
dismissals under Rule 41(aXl) must explicitly state if prejudice is to
attach."115 Finally, the stipulation did not contemplate that a court
order was necessary to make it effective." 6 Therefore, the court held
that the
stipulation of dismissal was filed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)117
(ii).

111. Id. at 1276.
A plaintiff may dismiss an action voluntarily without a court order in two
circumstances: by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves an
answer or motion for summary judgment, FED. R. CIv. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), or at any
time during the litigation by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties
who have appeared, FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
Id.
112. Id. "Under Rule 41(a)(2), the court has discretion to dismiss the case through an
order and to specify the terms of that dismissal." Id.
113. Id. Noting that it "ha[d] never specifically addressed the standard [used] when
reviewing a district court's construction of a Rule 41(a) filing," the Eleventh Circuit applied
a de novo review to the district court's determination of whether the stipulation of
dismissal was filed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) or Rule 41(a)(2) because that "is a legal
conclusion that can be made on the face of the filing and does not depend on facts the
district court should find in the first instance." Id. at 1276 (citing De Leon v. Marcos, 659
F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 2011); Cunningham v. Whitener, 182 F. App'x 966, 968-69
(l1th Cir. 2006)). The court then found that a de novo review required it "to determine the
parties' intent when they filed [the stipulation of dismissal], and the best indication of that
intent [was] the document itself." Id. at 1276 (citing De Leon, 659 F.3d at 1283-84
(interpreting a filing de novo, analyzing its contents, and comparing them to the
requirements found in Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and Rule 41(a)(2) to determine which controls)).
114. Id. at 1276.
115. Id. In contrast, Rule 41(a)(2) leaves the final dismissal terms to the district court's
discretion. Id.; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 41(a)(2) ("Unless the order states otherwise, a
dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice").
116. Reese, 677 F.3d at 1276 ("There is no signature line for the district court, and the
statement retaining jurisdiction is not a request made to the district court but a declaration
of retained jurisdiction.").
117. Id. at 1276-77. The court held that the stipulation's reference to Rule 41(a)(2) was
an apparent drafting error. Id. at 1277.
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The court then examined when a stipulation can dismiss a case under
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)." ' Although it previously held that a notice of
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) becomes effective upon the filing,'19
the court had "never directly addressed whether a stipulation
filed
12
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is similarly self-executing." 1
Acknowledging that "[miost of our sister circuits have directly or
implicitly found, in published and unpublished opinions, that a
stipulation filed under Rule 41(a)(1XA)(ii) is self-executing and dismisses
the case upon filing,""' the court held that "[w]e have found that
notices of dismissals allowed for under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) are effective
upon filing, and we find no reason to require judicial approval of
stipulations of dismissal fied under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)."' 22 Therefore,
the court held that "the plain language of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) requires
that a stipulation filed pursuant to that subsection is self-executing and
dismisses the case upon its becoming effective." 123 The court further
held that the stipulation is effective when filed, unless a subsequent
occurrence is specified as a condition. 124 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit held that an effective stipulation strips the district court of
25
jurisdiction and prevents them from taking action.'
The court then analyzed whether the stipulation of dismissal in the
case at bar was "effective upon filing and if so, whether the district court
properly retained jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement" after
the stipulation was filed. 126 Noting that it has not addressed the effect
of a district court order entered after a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation

118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Matthews v. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1990)). 'The
distinctions Rule 41(a)(1) draws between stipulations and notices are based on the stage
of litigation during which they may be filed. The Rules make no distinction regarding their
effect on litigation." Id. at 1278.
120. Id. at 1277.
121. Id.; see Kabbaj v. Am. Sch. of Tangier, 445 F. App'x 541, 544 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam); SmallBizPros, Inc. v. McDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam);
Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2004); Green v. Nevers, 111
F.3d 1295, 1301 (6th Cir. 1997); In re Wolf, 842 F.2d 464,466 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam);
Gardiner v. AH Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984); De Leon, 659 F.3d at 1284;
see also Marino v. Pioneer Edsel Sales, Inc., 349 F.3d 746, 752 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003);
Commercial Space Mgmt. Co. v. Boeing Co., 193 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999).
122. Anago Franchising,Inc., 677 F.3d at 1278 (citing In re Wolf, 842 F.2d at 466
(noting cases interpreting Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) to determine the effect of a Rule 41(a)(1)(AXii)
filing)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing SmallBizPros, 618 F.3d at 464).
126. Id.
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filing,'27 the Eleventh Circuit looked to the Supreme Court's decision
in Kokkonen, wherein the Supreme Court held that a district court could
retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement if the parties
agreed and if the district court had issued an order requiring compliance
with the settlement agreement.'28 "In that case, non-compliance would
be a violation of a court order[,] and the district court could use its
ancillary jurisdiction to enforce its orders and (by extension enforce the
settlement agreement)."'29 The Eleventh Circuit found that Kokkonen
was based on the "well-established proposition" that, in order "[tlo retain
jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, the court itself must act;
agreement by the parties is not enough." 13'
However, the Eleventh Circuit noted the tension created by the
language in Kokkonen which stated that, "in the context of a 'Rule
41(a)(1)[(A)](ii) [dismissal], .

.

. the [district] court is authorized to

embody the settlement contract in its dismissal order (or, what has the
same effect, retain jurisdiction over the settlement contract) if the
parties agree."""' The Eleventh Circuit held that "[tIhis language
creates a tension between the self-executing nature of a stipulation of
dismissal which strips the district court of jurisdiction to issue orders
and the Supreme Court's allowance of a postdismissal order to have the
effect of retaining jurisdiction."'32 The court noted that the Fifth
Circuit had resolved this tension "by focusing on the mechanics of Rule
41 and allowing the parties to make the effectiveness of their stipulation
contingent on action by the district court."' 33 Specifically, the Fifth
Circuit held that a "district court can retain jurisdiction if '[(1)] all the
requirements for retaining jurisdiction [are] met at the time of filing, or

127. Id. at 1279.
128. Id. at 1278 (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381).
129. Id. (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381). "The Supreme Court [in Kokkonen] stated
that a district court could require compliance by either making the settlement agreement
part of the court order by a separate provision 'retaining jurisdiction' or by incorporating
the terms of the agreement into the order itself." Id. (quotingKokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381).
130. Id. at 1279 (citing SmalUBizPros, 618 F.3d at 464 n.4 (contemplating a situation

that "might arise in which a district court may lack jurisdiction to enforce a settlement
agreement" despite "the parties expressly providing for ancillary jurisdiction in their
stipulation for dismissal")).

131. Id. (quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381-82).
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing SmalUBizPros, 618 F.3d at 463). The Eleventh Circuit also noted that
the Seventh Circuit had "resolved this tension by finding that Kokkonen allows the district
court to 'take certain postdismissal action in furtherance of its ancillary jurisdiction' despite
the fact that generally a Rule 41(aX1)(AXii) stipulation divests the court of jurisdiction."
Id. (quoting Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1078 (7th Cir. 2009)).
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[(2)] the filing's effectiveness [is] contingent upon a future' 1act (such as
the district court issuing an order retaining jurisdiction). ) 3
Agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held that "a
district court cannot retain jurisdiction by issuing a postdismissal order
to that effect" because "[a] district court loses all power over determinations of the merits of a case when it is voluntarily dismissed."'3 5 The
Eleventh Circuit read the holding in Kokkonen "in light of the plain
language of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and [held] that it allows the district court
to retain jurisdiction through an order, even if the parties dismissed the
case through use of Rule 41(a)(1)(AXii), [ifl the parties agree to the
retention of jurisdiction." 1 36 However, to retain jurisdiction, an order
must be entered prior to the Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation becoming
effective.' 37 Therefore, in order
for a district court to retain jurisdiction over a settlement agreement
where the parties dismiss the case by filing a stipulation of dismissal
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), either (1) the district court must issue
the order retaining jurisdiction under Kokkonen prior to the filing of
the stipulation, or (2) the parties must condition the effectiveness of the
stipulation
on the district court's entry of an order retaining jurisdic138
tion.

Applying these findings to the case at bar, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the underlying lawsuit was dismissed when the parties filed the
stipulation of dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1XA)(ii).'39 According to the court, "[t]he Stipulation did not condition its
effectiveness on the issuance of an order by the district court retaining

jurisdiction, and the court did not issue such an order prior to the
dismissal of the case." 4 ' Because the case was dismissed by the filing
of the stipulation of dismissal with prejudice and jurisdiction was not
retained, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider the

134. Id. (quoting SmallBizPros, 618 F.3d at 463).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1280.
137. Id.
138. Id.
As the Fifth Circuit noted, this does not transform a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation
into a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal (requiring a court order) because the parties
themselves are agreeing to the conditional effectiveness of the stipulation, and the
court would not be empowered to impose new conditions on the parties. If the
district court does not issue an order retaining jurisdiction, the stipulation would
simply not become effective and the case would not be dismissed.
Id. at 1280 n.4 (internal citation omitted).
139. Id. at 1281.
140. Id.
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defendants' motion to compel compliance with the settlement agreement."'
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit "vacate[d] the district
court's ruling on the [defendants'] [m] otion to [c] ompel" compliance with
the settlement agreement, and "remand[ed] the case with instructions
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction."'
V.

A.

ARBITRATION

Authority to Decide Challenges to ArbitrationAgreements

1. Whether the district court or an arbitratorhas authority to
decide the formation challenges, when a contract containing an
arbitration agreement is part of a broader, comprehensive
agreement, and a party challenges both the formation of the
contract and the formation of the comprehensive agreement. In
Solymar Investments, LTD. v. Banco Santander S.A., 4 ' the Eleventh
Circuit addressed the novel question of whether a court, having found
a valid contract containing an arbitration clause was formed, also has
the authority to consider formation challenges to a broader, comprehensive agreement encompassing that contract.'" The dispute in Solymar
arose out of settlement negotiations between various investment holding
corporations (the plaintiffs) and a related group of banking corporations
operating under the umbrella of Banco Santander, as well as certain
officers and employees of Santander (Santander). 4 '
The plaintiffs invested money with Santander, who in turn invested
the money in a fund that was part of the Madoff Ponzi scheme. The
plaintiffs sustained losses, which they sought to recover from Santander.
The plaintiffs and Santander agreed to a multi-part settlement that
included an Exchange Agreement.
The agreement included an
arbitration clause. Although the parties signed the Exchange Agreement, they never finalized or signed the other documents comprising the
comprehensive settlement agreement.' 46

141. Id. While the court noted that "Rule 41(a)(1)(A) [was] a useful tool in settling
cases because it allows parties to dismiss an action without a court order," it cautioned that
"ancillary jurisdiction does not allow a court to enforce a filed stipulation in the same way
it allows a court to enforce its orders." Id. (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380-81).
142. Id.
143. 672 F.3d 981 (11th Cir. 2012).
144. Id. at 985.
145. Id. at 985-86.
146. Id. at 986-88. The Exchange Agreement "involved an exchange of 'Worthless'
[shares from the Ponzi scheme investment] for shares of Santander's own perpetual, noncumulative 2% shares." Id. at 986.
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The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for
Southern District of Florida, asserting claims against Santander arising
out of the investment losses and the subsequent settlement negotiations. 147 Santander asked the district court to dismiss the case
pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Exchange Agreement.
Although the comprehensive settlement agreement was never finalized,
Santander argued that the Exchange Agreement was an independent,
binding contract and that the arbitration clause therein should be
enforced. The plaintiffs challenged the binding nature of the Exchange
Agreement itself, not the arbitration clause, arguing that it was the
district court's role to decide whether the Exchange Agreement was but
one part of an unexecuted (and thus unenforceable) "comprehensive
agreement between the parties." 14' The district court found that the
Exchange Agreement was a binding contract, and under Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.'49 and Granite Rock Co.
v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,'5" the plaintiffs' challenges
should be resolved in arbitration pursuant to the Exchange Agreement's
arbitration52 clause.' 5 ' The plaintiffs appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.
In its analysis, the court first discussed "who shall decide what in the
context of formation challenges to contracts containing arbitration
clauses."'53 In the seminal arbitration case of Prima Paint,the United
States Supreme Court announced that "courts are the proper forum to
evaluate a challenge to the validity of an arbitration clause, but where
the entire agreement of which an arbitration clause is but a part is
challenged, such evaluation is properly left to the arbitrator."1 5 4 In
subsequent cases decided after Prima Paint, the "Supreme Court
declined to clarify whether a court or an arbitrator is required to decide
any and all disputes over the formation of an agreement containing an

147. Id. at 988.
148. Id. at 988-89.
149. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
150. 130 S.Ct. 2847 (2010).
151. Solymar, 672 F.3d at 988.
152. Id. at 988, 999.
153. Id. at 989.
154. Id. Under Prima Paint, the relevant inquiry hinges on "whether the challenge
raised is to the arbitration clause specifically" (to be resolved by the court), "or to the
contract in which the arbitration clause is found generally" (to be resolved in arbitration).
Id. at 998. The Eleventh Circuit found that because the plaintiffs did not differentiate
between the formation of the arbitration clause specifically and instead challenged the
formation of the entire Exchange Agreement, under PrimaPaintthe plaintiffs' challenges
must be determined by the arbitrator. Id. at 998-99.
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arbitration clause," but it did recognize "a distinction between challenges
to the validity of an agreement containing an arbitration clause, which
were reserved for an arbitrator; and challenges to the formation of an
agreement containing an arbitration clause."155
For example, in Granite Rock the Supreme Court provided some
clarification and held that issues regarding formation of contracts are
usually left to the courts.'
Accordingly, in Solymar, the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that this "determination is the threshold question in
any dispute involving arbitration."'57 Thus, "arbitration of a dispute
should only be ordered where 'the court is satisfied that neither the
formation of the parties' arbitration agreement nor... its enforceability
or applicability to the dispute is in issue. Where a party contests either
' 158
or both matters, the court must resolve the disagreement. "
Applying the Supreme Court's legal concepts to the facts in Solymar,
the Eleventh Circuit first addressed the district court's resolution of the
formation challenges.'5 9 The plaintiffs argued that: "(a) [the Exchange
Agreement] was procured by Santander's fraud in the factum; (b) there
was no meeting of the minds; and (c) the conditions precedent were
never fulfilled."'
According to the court, "[ulnderlying all three of
those challenges [was the plaintiffs'] contention that, since the Exchange
Agreement was but a part of the parties' intended settlement, the
district court was required to resolve the [plaintiffs'] challenges in
relation to the comprehensive agreement." 6 '
In addressing the plaintiffs' argument "that their challenges go not
just to the formation of the Exchange Agreement, but also to the
formation of a broader agreement,"'62 the Eleventh Circuit reasoned
as follows:
In the context of the FAA, ...
challenges to the role of a written
agreement are not questions of formation but rather of validity...

With the district court having satisfied itself that the Exchange
Agreement was a binding contract, asking the district court to assess
the validity of the Exchange Agreement relative to a broader,

155. Id. at 989 (emphasis added) (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 444 (2006); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 990 (quoting GraniteRock, 130 S. Ct. at 2857-58).
159. Id. at 990-93.
160. Id. at 991.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 992.
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unexecuted agreement would be an invasion of the responsibility that
the Supreme Court has reserved for the arbitrator.'6
The plaintiffs argued that, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in
Granite Rock, the district court erred in not considering all formation
challenges.1' The Eleventh Circuit rejected this broad interpretation
of Granite Rock, reasoning that to do so "would constitute broader
inquiry than contemplated by the Granite Rock or PrimaPaint Courts;
and, just as importantly, it would be contrary to the explicit terms of the
Exchange Agreement."' 65
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the Exchange
Agreement was a binding and enforceable contract under Florida
law.'6 6 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order
dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint in favor of arbitration, finding 16that
7
the plaintiffs' challenges were properly reserved for the arbitrator.
2. Whether challenges to the scope of the arbitration agreement, and whether specific claims that fall within the same,
should be decided by the Court or the arbitrator. In Given v.
M&T Bank Corp.,' the Eleventh Circuit held that the decision of
whether certain claims fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement
was a decision for an arbitrator, not a district court.'69 The controversy in Given arose when bank customer Maxine Given (Given) filed a
putative class action against Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company
(M&T Bank), alleging that M&T Bank improperly charged overdraft fees
to its checking account customers. Given filed suit in a Maryland
federal district court. When M&T Bank filed a motion to compel
arbitration, the case was transferred to the United States District Court
for the0 Southern District of Florida and consolidated with related
17
cases.
'The district court denied M&T Bank's motion to compel arbitration,
finding that the arbitration agreement [was] unconscionable under

163. Id. at 992-93 (emphasis added).
164. See id. at 993.
165. Id. at 994.
166. Id. at 995-96.
167. Id. at 999.
168. 674 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2012).
169. Id. at 1256-57.
170. Id. at 1254. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated in the
Southern District of Florida numerous putative class actions involving similar claims
relating to overdraft fees on checking accounts against approximately thirty banks, and the
consolidated litigation was the subject of several appeals to the Eleventh Circuit in 2012.
Garcia v. Wachovia, N.A., 699 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012).
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Circuit heard oral arguments, the Supreme Court decided AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,"' a case which involved the FAA's
Accordingly, the
preemption of state unconscionability laws.'73
Eleventh Circuit "vacated the district court's order denying the motion
to compel arbitration and remanded the case for reconsideration in light
of the Concepcion decision.", 74 , M&T Bank renewed its motion to
compel arbitration, and the district court again denied the motion, this
time finding that because Given sought injunctive relief, her claims were
not within the scope of the arbitration agreement.'75
M&T Bank appealed again, arguing that "the district court erred by
deciding whether Given's claims [were] within the scope of the arbitration agreement, [and] that an arbitrator should have decided that
question." 7 The Eleventh Circuit analyzed the arbitration agreement
and found that it contained a "delegation provision," wherein the parties
agreed to arbitrate the "gateway" question of whether the arbitration
agreement applies to and covers a particular claim or issue. 17 7 The
court recognized that delegation provisions are valid and should be
enforced "as long as there is 'clear and unmistakable' evidence that the
78
parties manifested their intent to arbitrate a gateway question."
Analyzing the terms of the delegation provision at issue in Given, the
Eleventh Circuit found "clear and unmistakable evidence that M&T
Bank and Given manifested their intent to arbitrate whether
Given's
179
claims [fell] within the scope of the arbitration agreement."
Given argued that the delegation provision was ambiguous, and thus
the gateway question should not be arbitrated. 180 The court rejected
her argument, finding that the language "any issue" in the arbitration
clause was not ambiguous and should not be limited.'
Thus, the
court concluded that the arbitrator was the proper decision-maker

171. Given, 674 F.3d at 1254-55.
172. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
173. See id. at 1747.
174. Given, 674 F.3d at 1255.
175. Id. The district court did not reach the issue of whether the arbitration agreement
was unconscionable under Maryland law, Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1256. Given also argued that the arbitration agreement was procedurally
unconscionable. The court declined to address this challenge because she had not
specifically challenged the unconscionability of the delegation provision before the district

court. Id.
181. Id.
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regarding
whether the arbitration agreement encompassed Given's
182
claims.

Both Given and Solymar provide guidance to what authority a district
court has in deciding certain issues regarding arbitration agreements
and when these issues must be decided by the arbitrator.
B.

Application of Concepcion and State Law UnconscionabilityRules

As discussed briefly above, on April 27, 2011, the United States
Supreme Court issued an opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,l' 3 holding that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (FAA)
preempted California's "Discover Bank" rule,"M which provided that
class-action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion were unconscio8 5
nable."
In Concepcion, the Court found that because the overarching
purpose of the FAA was to ensure enforcement of arbitration agreements
according to the agreements' terms, state law requiring the availability
of class arbitration was inconsistent with the FAA.18 6 In 2012, the
Eleventh Circuit issued numerous opinions addressing Concepcion's
impact on claims for arbitration in this circuit.
1. Whether a party may waive its right to arbitrate the
conscionability of an arbitration clause. In Hough v. Regions
Financial Corp., 7 the Eleventh Circuit held that a party will waive
its right to arbitrate the conscionability of an arbitration clause if it asks
the district court to rule on the conscionability challenge.'
In Hough,
plaintiffs Lawrence and Pamela Hough sued Regions Financial
Corporation and Regions Bank (Regions) in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida for allegedly violating federal
and state law by collecting overdraft charges from bank customers
pursuant to their deposit agreements. 8 9
Regions moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in
the Houghs' deposit agreement. 9 ° The district court denied the
motion, finding "that the arbitration clause was substantively unconscio-

182. Id. at 1256-57.
183. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). For a discussion of Concepcion, see Sullivan, et al., supra
note 1, at 1342-44.
184. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
185. Id. at 1753.
186. Id.
187. 672 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012). Hough also arose as part of the MDL Action
pending in the Southern District of Florida. See id. at 1226-28; Garcia,699 F.3d at 1276.
188. Hough, 672 F.3d at 1228.
189. Id. at 1226.

190. Id.
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nable because it contained a class action waiver."191 In light of
Concepcion, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's ruling and
remanded for further consideration." 2 On remand, Regions renewed
its motion to compel,'93 but the district court again denied the motion,
finding that "the arbitration clause was substantially unconscionable
under Georgia law because a provision granting Regions the unilateral
right to recover its expenses for arbitration allocated disproportionately
to the 94Houghs the risks of error and loss inherent in dispute resolution."
Regions again appealed, arguing that "[(1)1 the district court should
have submitted the issue of conscionability to the arbitrator, [(2)] the
arbitration clause was conscionable and, [(3)] even if unconscionable, the
clause was severable."' 95 In addressing the first issue, the Eleventh
Circuit held that although the arbitration "clause contained 'sweeping
language concerning the scope of the questions committed to arbitration'
and 'clearly and unmistakably provid[ed]' that an arbitrator should
resolve 'any claim of unconscionability,"' Regions waived the right to
arbitrate the conscionability issue.'96 The court focused on the fact
Regions had not argued the issue should be decided by the arbitrator in
response to the Houghs' arguments that the clause was unconscionable,
but instead asked the district court to rule on (and deny) the conscionability challenge. 9 7 Because Regions asked the district court to decide
the issue, it waived its right to arbitrate whether the arbitration clause
198
was unconscionable.
Next, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether the district court erred
in finding that the arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable.'99 "The arbitration agreement permitted Regions, if it was 'the
prevailing party,' to obtain 'reimburse[ment] for [its] costs and expenses
(including reasonable attorney's fees) ... [in] arbitration' and to collect

191. Id.
192. Id.

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1226, 1228. Because the Eleventh Circuit found that the arbitration clause
was conscionable, it did not address whether the clause was severable. Id. at 1228.
196. Id. at 1228 (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003);
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).
197. Id. at 1227. The delegation provision in the arbitration agreement provided as
follows: "Any dispute regarding whether a particular controversy is subject to arbitration,

including any claim of unconscionability and any dispute over the scope or validity of this
agreement to arbitrate disputes or of this entire Agreement, shall be decided by the
arbitrator(s).'" Id.

198. Id. at 1227-28.
199. Id. at 1229.
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that amount by 'charg[ing] [the Houghs'] account.' 2 °° The district
court found that the arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable "because Regions had an exclusive right of setoff.""° ' The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed, noting that under Georgia law "'an
arbitration provision is not unconscionable [simply] because it lacks
mutuality of remedy."'20 2 The district court also found that the
arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable,2 3 but the Eleventh Circuit again disagreed, finding that "to be unconscionable under
Georgia law, a contract must be 'so one-sided' that 'no sane man not
acting under a delusion would make and that no honest man would'
participate in the transaction."0 4 The court reasoned that the arbitration clause at issue in Hough did not meet this standard.2 5 Thus, the
court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case with
instructions to compel arbitration.2 6
2. Whether a party waived its right to compel arbitration
because it did not argue that the FAA preempted a state
unconscionability law prior to Concepcion. In Garciav. Wachovia
Corp.,27 the Eleventh Circuit held that a party who did not argue that

the FAA preempted state laws purporting to make class-wide arbitration
provisions unenforceable before the Supreme Court decided Concepcion,
but instead participated in litigation and only demanded arbitration
after Concepcion was decided, waived its right to arbitrate. 20 ' This
case involved five separate putative class actions, wherein the plaintiffs
alleged that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Wachovia Bank, N.A. (Wells
Fargo) improperly charged overdraft fees to their checking account

200.
201.
202.
S.E.2d

Id. (alterations in original) (internal punctuation omitted).
Id.
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Great Am. Cash Advance, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 690,693,644
522, 525 (2007)).

203. Id. The district court found it troubling "that the clause was presented to the
Houghs 'on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no opt-out provision."' Id. The Eleventh Circuit
noted that "under Georgia law, an adhesion contract is not per se unconscionable." Id.
"The district court [had] also criticized the clause as 'not conspicuous.'" Id. However, the

Eleventh Circuit found that "the district court overlooked other aspects of the document
that made apparent the agreement to arbitrate," including bold, capitalized text on the first
several pages that referenced the binding arbitration provisions within. Id.
204. Id. (quoting NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390,391, 391 n.2,478 S.E.2d 769,

771 (1996)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 230.
207. 699 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2012). Garciawas consolidated with the MDL Action
pending in the Southern District of Florida in June 2009. Id. at 1276.
208. Id. at 1276.
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customers. The checking accounts were governed by agreements that
contained an arbitration clause, and the arbitration clause provided for
arbitration of disputes on an individual basis.2 °9
to
During the litigation, the district court "twice invited Wells Fargo 21
move to compel arbitration," but Wells Fargo declined to do so. 1
Instead, the parties engaged in extensive discovery,21' litigated several
motions before the district court, and prepared their cases for trial.
However, just days after the Supreme Court issued Concepcion, Wells
Fargo moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion,
finding that Wells Fargo had waived its right to arbitrate.2 2
On appeal, "Wells Fargo argue[d] that it did not waive its right to
compel arbitration because it would have been futile to move to compel
arbitration before the Supreme Court decided Concepcion."'18 Specifically, Wells Fargo argued that "the state laws governing the customer
agreements foreclosed Wells Fargo from enforcing the agreements to
arbitrate on an individual rather than class-wide basis, " '24and thus,
moving to compel before Concepcion would have been futile. 215 The
Eleventh Circuit first examined whether Wells Fargo had waived its
right to compel arbitration.21
The Court then examined whether it
would have been futile for Wells Fargo to move to compel arbitration
before the Supreme Court decided Concepcion.217
First, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that a party's conduct may
waive its arbitration rights.1 ' To determine if a party has waived its

209. Id. at 1275.
210. Id. Specifically, on November 6, 2009, the district court ordered Wells Fargo to
file "all merits and non-merits motions .. .," including any motions to compel arbitration,
by December 8, 2009. Id. at 1276. Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss, but it did not
move to compel arbitration. Id. "On April 14, 2010, the district court [again] offered Wells
Fargo a second opportunity to move to compel arbitration by April 19, 2010." Id. Wells
Fargo did not so move and instead declined to elect to arbitrate the disputes. Id. Wells
Fargo even went so far as to inform the court that it "did not move for an order compelling
arbitration ... nor does it intend to seek arbitration of [its customers'] claims in the
future." Id.
211. The parties "served and answered interrogatories, produced approximately 900,000
pages of discovery documents, and took approximately 20 depositions." Id.
212. Id. at 1276-77.
213. Id. at 1275.
214. Id. at 1276. The customer agreements at issue were governed by the laws of
California, Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington. Id. at 1276-77.
215. Id. at 1277.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1278.
218. Id. at 1277 (quoting S&H Contractors, Inc. v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., 906 F.2d 1507,
1514 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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right to arbitration, courts apply a two-part test: (1) has the party,
"under the totality of the circumstances, ... acted inconsistently with
the arbitration right," and (2) "by [acting inconsistently with the
arbitration right], [has] that party.. . in some way prejudiced the other
party."21 9 The Eleventh Circuit found that Wells Fargo's conduct was
inconsistent with its right to arbitration in two ways: by failing to move
to compel arbitration despite repeated invitations to do so from the
district court, 22' and by utilizing "the litigation machinery" before
demanding arbitration. 22 1 The court reasoned that compelling arbitration would substantially harm the plaintiffs for two reasons. 222 The
plaintiffs spent significant amounts of money to litigate, and these sums
were exactly the types of expenses that arbitration was designed to
alleviate. 22' Also, Wells Fargo gained advantages from discovery that
would not have been available during arbitration; thus, Wells Fargo's
delay in moving to compel arbitration prejudiced the plaintiff's legal
position. 22 4 Accordingly, the court concluded that Wells Fargo had
waived its right to arbitrate.225
Next, the Eleventh Circuit turned to Wells Fargo's futility argument
and recognized that "because 'It]his circuit does not require a litigant to
engage in futile gestures,' a party will not waive its right to arbitrate by
failing to act whenever 'any motion to compel would almost certainly
have been futile.' 22 ' However, the court then noted that "absent
controlling Supreme Court or circuit precedent foreclosing a right to
arbitrate, a motion to compel arbitration will almost never be futile."227
Wells Fargo argued the low chance of success excused its decision to not
file a motion to compel arbitration. 22' The Eleventh Circuit held this

219. Id. (quoting Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (11th Cir.
2002)). "To determine whether the other party has been prejudiced, '[a court] may consider
the length of delay in demanding arbitration and the expense incurred by that party from
participating in the litigation process.'" Id. (quoting S&H Contractors,906 F.2d at 1514).
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting S&H Contractors, 906 F.2d at 1514).
222. Id. at 1278.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1277.
226. Id. at 1278 (quoting Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850, 854
(11th Cir. 1986)).
227. Id. The court adopted the Eighth Circuit's explanation that "a party must move
to compel arbitration whenever 'it should have been clear to [the party] that the arbitration
agreement was at least arguably enforceable.'" Id. (quoting Se. Stud & Components, Inc.
v. Am. Eagle Design Build Studios, L.L.C., 588 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 2009)).
228. Id.
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was the wrong standard for the futility doctrine under its precedent.22
Specifically, the court reasoned that to avoid waiving the arbitration
right under the futility doctrine, it must be "almost certain"--not merely
"unlikely"-that a motion to compel would have been denied.' ° The
court reasoned that Wells Fargo's more lenient standard would "only
'encourage litigants to delay moving to compel arbitration until they
could ascertain how the case was going in federal district court,' and
would undermine one 'of the basic
231 purposes of arbitration: a fast,
claims."'
of
resolution
inexpensive
In applying the futility standard to the facts in Garcia,the Eleventh
Circuit held that a motion to compel arbitration filed before Concepcion
would not have been almost certainly denied because "Wells Fargo could
have argued exactly what the Supreme Court held in Concepcion: that
the Act preempts state contract laws that condition the enforceability of
consumer arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide
arbitration procedures. 232 Finding that "[nleither Supreme Court nor
[its own] precedents foreclosed that argument," the court held that "'it
should have been clear to [Wells Fargo] that the arbitration agreement
was at least arguably enforceable."' 3 Thus, the court held that "[b]y
failing to make this argument, Wells Fargo waived its right to compel
arbitration."2 '
3. Whether state laws prohibiting arbitration as unconscionable are preempted by the FAA post-Concepcion. In 2012, the
Eleventh Circuit issued two opinions discussing the impact of Concepcion
on state law unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements.
In Barras v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,235 the Eleventh Circuit
analyzed a state unconscionability doctrine under the parameters of
Concepcion
and held that the doctrine was not preempted by the
FAA. 236 In Barras, defendant Branch Banking & Trust Company

229. Id.
230. Id. at 1279.
231. Id. (quoting In re Mirant Corp., 613 F.3d 584, 590 (5th Cir. 2010); O.R. Secs. Inc.
v. Profl Planning Ass'n, 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988)) (internal punctuation and
citations omitted).

232. Id.
233. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Se. Stud, 588 F.3d at 967).
234. Id.
235. 685 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012). Barras is yet another appeal arising from the
MDL Action. It was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Id. at 1273 n.1.
236. Id. at 1277.
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(BB&T) appealed the district court's order denying its motion to compel
arbitration of a putative class action brought by plaintiff Lacy Barras
relating to overdraft fees for payments from checking accounts. BB&T
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement
contained in BB&T's services agreement, but the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the motion, finding
that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under South
Carolina law. BB&T appealed, but before the Eleventh Circuit ruled,
the Supreme Court decided Concepcion. 7 The Eleventh Circuit
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Concepcion."'
On remand, BB&T renewed its motion to compel arbitration, and the
district court again denied the motion, finding that (1) "BB&T had
waived its right to submit the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator
because BB&T already had submitted the issue of arbitrability to the
district court"; and (2) "the mandatory arbitration provision was
unconscionable because ... only BB&T could recover any costs and
attorneys' fees resulting from an arbitration regardless of whether BB&T
prevailed... .239 BB&T again appealed the order denying its motion,
arguing as follows:
(1) that the question of whether the arbitration provision is enforceable
must be resolved by the arbitrator; (2) that the cost-and-fee-shifting
provision in the agreement that the district court held unconscionable
does not apply to the arbitration provision; (3) that Concepcion
prohibits application of South Carolina's unconscionability doctrine to
the arbitration provision; (4) that the cost-and-fee-shifting provision, in
any event, is not unconscionable; and (5) that the cost-and-fee-shifting
provision is severable from the arbitration provision.' °
Because BB&T had litigated this action for over a year without
moving the district court to submit "the threshold issue of enforceability
to the arbitrator," and had instead "asked the district court to hold that
the arbitration agreement was enforceable," the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding that BB&T had waived its right to
arbitrate the question of arbitrability."
Further, applying South
Carolina law, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err
in finding that "the cost-and-fee-shifting provision is applicable to costs
2 42
arising from arbitration."

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1273-74.
1279.
1273-74.
1274.
1274-75 (citing Hough, 672 F.3d at 1228).
1275-76.
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In addressing BB&T's third challenge, the court noted that, even after
Concepcion, it has recognized "that 'generally applicable contract
defenses' that challenge 'defects in the making of the arbitration
agreement' and that 'do not apply only to arbitration or derive their
meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue' are 'not
Thus, the relevant inquiry became
affected by [Concepcion]. '24
whether a determination that the cost-and-fee-shifting provision was
unenforceable because it was unconscionable under South Carolina law
was a generally applicable contract defense not preempted by the
2
FAA. "

The court then distinguished South Carolina's unconscionability rule
from the California collective-action-waiver rule at issue in Concepcion,
concluding that "South Carolina's unconscionability doctrine does not
'interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration' as identified by the
Supreme Court and is among the 'generally applicable contract defenses'
that apply to arbitration agreements under the savings clause of 9
U.S.C. § 2. "245 Specifically, the court found as follows: (1) the South
Carolina law applied "to arbitration and to other agreements according
to the same basic criteria, and [those] criteria do not disproportionately
impact arbitration agreements"; (2) the South Carolina doctrine "does
not interfere with the procedural informality that Concepcionrecognized"
as the primary benefit of arbitration; (3) the South Carolina "unconscionability doctrine is one that is concerned with defects in the process of
contract formation," recognized as a valid defense under Section 2 of the
FAA; (4) the South Carolina rule "neither allows nor prohibits the
aggregation of claims at all"; and (5) the South Carolina "unconscionability doctrine is not 'applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration by
courts.' ' ,

4

6

Thus, the court held that South Carolina's unconscionabili-

ty doctrine is not preempted by the FAA. 24'

Accordingly, the court

243. Id. at 1277 (quoting Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1267 n.28 (11th
Cir. 2011) (internal punctuation omitted)). For a discussion of Community State Bank, see
Sullivan, et al., supra note 1, at 1344-48.
244. Barras, 685 F.3d at 1276; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
245. Barras, 685 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748).
246. Id. at 1277-78 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751).
247. Id. at 1279. The Eleventh Circuit next concluded that the cost-and-fee-shifting
provision as it applies to the arbitration agreement is unconscionable under South Carolina
law. Id. at 1280. Finally, the court addressed whether the cost-and-fee-shifting provision
of the arbitration agreement should be severed pursuant to the severability clause of the
contract, finding that, under South Carolina law, the cost-and-fee-shifting provision was
severable from the arbitration provision and the invalidity of the former did not affect the
latter. Id. at 1282.
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reversed the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration.m
In Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,249 the Eleventh Circuit again
analyzed a state unconscionability doctrine under the parameters of
Concepcion,but this time held that the state doctrine was preempted by
the FAA. 25" The plaintiff James Pendergast sued Sprint Solutions, Inc.
and Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (Sprint) in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida in a class action alleging that Sprint
251
charged improper roaming fees for certain calls.

Sprint moved to compel arbitration under the FAA and Sprint's service
contract with Pendergast.252 The district court granted Sprint's motion
to compel arbitration, and Pendergast appealed. Pendergast argued
that: (1) the waiver in the arbitration agreement was unconscionable
under Florida law and (2) "the arbitration clause and class action waiver
clause [were] not severable," making "the invalidity of the class action
253
waiver... fatal to the arbitration clause."
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis with an in-depth discussion
of the Supreme Court's opinion in Concepcion, followed by a discussion
of its recent opinion interpreting Concepcion in Cruz v. Cingular

Wireless, L.L. C. 54 In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that "the

FAA preempted California's state law that rendered most collective
action waivers in consumer contracts unconscionable," finding that
"[p]reemption was required because the California law required the
availability of classwide arbitration, which interfere [d] with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus create[d] a scheme inconsistent with

248. Id. at 1284.
249. 691 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012).
250. Id. at 1234.
251. Id. at 1225.
252. Id.
253. Id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit originally found that "resolution of the appeal
depended on unsettled questions of Florida law and certified.., questions to the Florida
Supreme Court." Id. at 1225-26. After oral argument in the Florida Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court decided Concepcion. Id. at 1226. In light of Concepcion,
Sprint moved the Eleventh Circuit to withdraw the certified questions, but the court denied
Sprint's motion so that the Florida Supreme Court would have the opportunity to decide
whether it wished to answer the certified questions or decline jurisdiction and remand the
case in light of Concepcion. Id. Sprint then moved the Florida Supreme Court to decline
jurisdiction, and the court granted Sprint's motion, returning the case to the Eleventh
Circuit. Id.
254. 648 F.3d 1205 (lth Cir. 2011). For a discussion of Cruz, see Sullivan et al., supra
note 1, at 1340-44.
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the FAA."255 In Cruz, the Eleventh Circuit applied Concepcion and
enforced an arbitration agreement under facts similar to those at issue
256
in Pendergast.
The Eleventh Circuit explained that in Cruz, it
declined to limit the scope of Concepcion to either (1) "state laws that
impose non-consensual class-wide arbitration," or (2) "inflexible,
categorical state laws that mechanically invalidate class waiver
provisions in a generic category of cases."257 The court in Cruz concluded that "'Itlo the extent that Florida law would require the
availability of classwide arbitration procedures in this case' because 'the
case involves numerous small-dollar claims by consumers against a
corporation, ...

such a258 state rule is inconsistent with and thus

preempted by the FAA.'
After discussing Concepcion and Cruz, the court stated that applying
these two cases was sufficient to resolve Pendergast's appealY 9
Because Pendergast's arguments, like the plaintiffs' arguments in
Concepcion, centered on his theory that the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable under state law because the agreement disallowed
classwide procedures, the Eleventh Circuit held that the FAA preempted
Florida law. 2"° Further, the court reaffirmed its position in Cruz that
"[t]he fact that the state rule forces the parties out of arbitration because
of their contractually-expressed falback position of preferring class
litigation to class arbitration does not make the state rule any more
consistent with the FAA." 261' Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of Pendergast's complaint and the district court's decision to
compel arbitration. 6 2

255. Pendergast,691 F.3d at 1230 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
256. Id. at 1233.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1234 (alteration in original) (quoting Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1215).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1234-35.
261. Id. at 1235.
262. Id. at 1236.

